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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NASRULLAKHAN, : 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : 
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, : Case No. 20070341 
ETAL., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appellant Khan files this Reply Brief. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. KHAN COMPLIED WITH UTAH R. APR P. 24(k), AND 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISREGARD HIS BRIEF. 
Khan is not a lawyer, and he is appearing pro se in this case. He also prepared his Brief 
of the Appellant in accordance with the "Checklist for Briefs - Rules 24, 26, and 27" in this 
Court's Pro Se Guide ~ Appeal Procedures. In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it held a pro se complaint "to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hence, Khan's Brief may not be like the one a 
lawyer would draft. 
In Appellees' Brief, they state: "Khan's brief lacks concision and organization. The brief 
fails to state whether or where Khan preserved his issues on appeal and it is bereft of a 
proper standard of review. The brief is little more than a collection of repetitive assertions 
that this Court should disregard" (pages 16-17). Khan disputes their statements. 
1 
Concerning the preservation of issues for appeal, in the Pro Se Guide, Checklist for 
Briefs, Content Requirements, it states: "5. Statement of the issues. For each issue state the 
standard of review and supporting authority;" pro se Khan complied with the requirements 
in the Pro Se Guide. Khan argues he had sufficiently preserved the issue about summary 
judgment for appeal in his memorandum opposing summary judgment, affidavit and 
exhibits (R. 320-420), and other pleadings, all of which were court records; the court made a 
ruling about summary judgment based on all those court records. He clearly stated in his 
Brief (pg. 8): "there was no hearing on the [summary judgment] motion;" hence, he could 
not present any objections or other issues to the court to preserve for appeal. Also, before 
the court issued its Order, he did not know what the Order would state, and he did not know 
which issues, if any, he would have to preserve for appeal. The Third District Court 
informed Khan that he had filed his motion for a new trial (R. 446-472) late; hence, he 
informed Appellees' Attorney Ferre on 4-10-07 that he was not serving that motion; he did 
not pursue that motion further. The foregoing are the exceptional circumstances for being 
unable to preserve for appeal two of his issues, i.e., abuses of discretion by the court, and the 
findings are clearly erroneous; hence, this Court should consider these two issues. {State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993)). Also, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) allows Khan to 
"thereafter" raise "the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings" 
whether or not he had "made in the district court an objection to such findings." 
Khan stated the standard of review and supporting authority for each issue in his Brief 
(pages 1-2). See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. 
2 
As required by Oneida/SLIC, v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994), to successfully appeal the court's findings of fact, Khan 
was required to marshal and "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists." Since he appealed the district court's numerous findings of fact and since there 
are about 523 pages of the record, for each finding, he marshaled and presented, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence which supported 
that particular finding; then, he argued and showed that finding is "so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making [it] clearly erroneous" (Id.). 
He also argued that the court committed abuses of discretion, and that it erred by granting 
summary judgment. Hence, Khan's Brief contains every scrap of numerous competent 
evidence, his arguments with evidence, and citations to the record; some of those maybe 
repetitive, but he had to, and did, comply with the laws and Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
For the foregoing reasons and for the circumstances of this appeal, his Brief does not lack 
concision and organization. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Hence, Khan complied with Utah 
R. App. P. 24(k), and this Court should not disregard or strike his Brief. He complied with 
the GRAMA statutes and the court rules in this case. He argues that Appellees' Brief does 
not comply with the one-inch margin requirement on the top of each page of briefs (Utah R. 
App. P. 27(a)); hence, this Court should strike their Brief. 
On page 17 of their Brief, Appellees mentioned Khan's federal cases in past years. 
Recently, in January 2007, Khan discovered evidence, DPS's Investigation Report, in which 
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DPS wrote " : • * • "•- - ^ nv, , >y* ^ h n P. 0 ;here didn't seem to be 
follow i ip on the numbers and people that Mr. Khan had identified [as the alleged 
perpetrators concerning the continuing crimes against him]. This was unfortunate, because 
it may have saved Mr. KH, ; coum\ r;iiL...:- .. . -i •-»: LJK< -•' - ;^ :. :. 
H:\\ * ' , x ^ - ! • ' . - - • - . . !•:! n',,)!i, -r:nn,!hatOi!den Police failed to 
investigate the evidence of the continuing crimes of phone harassment and stalking against 
him, that it concealed the evidence of those crimes, and that it obstructed justice. Khan 
argues this Pi'. • Kepuri is a very signiiK.uu ..: i^ipoi!,...-! - * ' •*.. * v. :;sc ( ):jdu; • P.* 
h :-.\ *• » • iicd'^  ;?.«*. - I'tcnili'K1 written false statements regarding the Tailure-to-investigatef 
and oilier issues in its numerous signed pleadings to the federal courts in order to deceive 
those courts and to deliberately interfere wil.* \l^ admir.iMriti.* *ii v>i n^uee. unfortunately 
he didnotha\ e this R eport and other si ich e\ idence at the tin le of 1 lis past federal eases, He 
had complied with the federal court rules, while Ogden City had not. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO APPELLEES, BECAUSE THEY DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE GRAMA, AND THE APPLICABLE GRAMA STATUTES 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES IN RESPONDING TO KHAN1 S 
FORMAI GRAMA REQUEST AND FORMAL GRAMA APPEALS, 
AND WITH DISCOVERY. 
Summary judgment should not be granted unless the truth is clear (Poller v. Cobmibia 
Broadcasting System. i>u .. : x - . / • w • --^ 
c^ f«- " . . • . * ' • • -\ so hed in lav oi ui the opposing party. 
Thus, "the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.'1 
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Frisbee v.K&KConstr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). "In reviewing an order 
granting summary judgment we consider only the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
answers to interrogatories, and affidavits properly before the trial judge." Granite Credit 
Union v. Remick, 133 P.3d 440, 443 note 4 (Utah App. 2006). "A single sworn statement is 
sufficient to create an issue of fact" Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
"Facts asserted by the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion, if supported by 
affidavits or other evidentiary material, are regarded as true." Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 3d §2727. "The evidence of the non-movant is to be 
believed." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
A. The district court incorrectly determined the Department 
complied with the GRAMA. 
Khan disputes Appellees' statements in their Brief (pg. 19): "[DPS] did not violate 
GRAMA in responding to Khan's records request. The undisputed evidence established that 
the Department did not possess any records about a Department investigation of Khan or of 
Khan's November 2002 complaint." In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e), and 
7(c)(3)(B) and (D), Khan filed his opposing affidavit (R. 413-420) with his memorandum in 
opposition to respondents' motion for summary judgment (R. 320-336). In his sworn 
affidavit, Khan wrote that, from Appellees, he also received relevant "Investigation Reports 
of Mr. Keyser, Mr. McKee, and Mr. Miller" (R. 419, para. 42); in Appellees' response, they 
"dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 42" (R. 430, para. 29); (the two records, which the 
court ordered Appellees to produce to Khan after redaction, are the Investigation Reports of 
Mr. Keyser and Mr. McKee (see Khan's Brief, pg. 8), and not of Mr. Miller). In Khan's 
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statement of additional facts in dispute, he wrote: "Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports are 
incomplete" (R. 410, para. 21); DPS responded that the document speaks for itself, and it 
"dispute[s] Khan's characterization of this correspondence to the extent it differs from the 
actual correspondence" (R. 424-25, para. 14). Mr. Miller's Reports, dated 06/05/2003, do 
not contain the material, Case-related information about "Terroristic Threats" against Khan, 
"Possible Criminal Actions," and the "Letter" in the "Synopsis" and other sections (other 
than the Headings); the note, in the "Synopsis" section, was written on 8-23-06 while 
discovery in this case was ongoing (Addendum B, R. 221 & R. 222). 
DPS refers to the Investigation Reports of Mr. Miller, Mr. Keyser and Mr. McKee as 
"correspondence" and "notes," instead of by the title "Investigation Report" which is on 
those reports {Id., R. 369-372, & R. 373-374; R. 424-25, paras. 14 & 12). In their affidavits 
for Appellees, Mr. Wyss and Ms. Turtle wrote they produced the "documents listed on the 
attached document index" (R. 304, para. 6; R. 313, para. 6); in their indexes, they 
themselves describe R. 221, R. 222, R. 373-374, and R. 369-372 as "Investigation 
Report[s]" (see R. 309, 310, 318 & 319, DPS/SRC 203, 221-222 & 223-226). Appellees 
wrote: "[The two documents [Investigation Reports] prepared by Agents Keyser and 
McKee] contain mental impressions of Agent Keyser [about Khan], the public revelation of 
which would chill an investigator's candidness and, again, the ability to [fully] investigate 
sensitive security complaints" (R. 190). At the hearing, their Attorney stated; "I think 
particularly the document dated November 22nd unnecessarily reveals the department's 
investigative procedures,. .." (R. 513, pg. 6). Hence, these Reports are Investigation 
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Reports. In his affidavit, Khan wrote: "I did not request Mr. Keyser, Mr. McKee, and/or the 
Department to conduct a formal or informal investigation of me" (R. 414, para. 13); in 
DPS's response, it "disputes the allegations contained in paragraph 13" (R. 427, para. 10). In 
his complaints to DPS, he did not request DPS to conduct an investigation of him 
(Addendum B, R. 373); in his GRAMA request, he requested records "concerning my 
[November 8, 2002] complaints" to DPS, and not concerning investigation 'of him' 
(Addendum B, R. 299). DPS CAO wrote that Khan requested records of Mr. Keyser 
regarding his investigation "of [Khan]" (Addendum B, R. 11); DPS did not produce any 
evidence or cite any record to show that Khan requested Mr. Keyser or DPS to conduct an 
investigation of Khan. The Investigation Reports of Mr. Keyser and Mr. McKee show 
official and formal or informal investigations "of Khan" (R. 370 & R. 374; R. 329-330). 
The Investigation Reports of Mr. Miller and Mr. Keyser show official and formal or 
informal investigations of Khan's November 8, 2002 complaints of terrorism and crimes 
against him and the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police. (See Khan's Brief, pgs. 14-15, 
and 30). DPS assigned case numbers to those Reports; the investigations were formal. 
Khan stated that the affidavits of Mr. Wyss and Ms. Turtle are misleading, inaccurate, and 
invalid (his Brief pgs. 16-18 and 39-41). Khan's competent evidence established that DPS 
possessed Investigation Reports about DPS's investigations of him and of his November 8, 
2002 complaints. 
Khan set forth specific facts, which DPS disputes, about: Mr. Miller's Investigation 
Reports being incomplete and untrue (Addendum B, R. 221 & R. 222); DPS possessing 
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Investigation Reports of Mr. Keyser, Mr. McKee, and Mr. Miller that it disputes (R. 424-25, 
paras. 12-14); these Investigation Reports indicating DPSfs investigations of Khan and of his 
November 8, 2002 complaints; and these Reports being responsive to his GRAMA request. 
These material facts show that there are genuine issues for trial. 
Khan disputes DPS's statements in its Brief (pages 20-22): 
Khan again failed to identify the requested information with any degree of specificity 
let alone the 'reasonable specificity' required by the statute. . .. [N]o evidence was 
found to support your claims and no formal investigation was conducted . . . [DPS] 
does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA request... [DPS's] interpretation 
of Khan's request is fair and reasonable. [DPS's] response that it had conducted no 
investigation and thus had no investigation records is likewise accurate and in 
compliance with GRAMA. .. . [DPS] does not now, nor has it ever, possessed records 
relevant to Khan's GRAMA request. .. . The undisputed, competent evidence supports 
the trial court's conclusion. [DPS] complied with GRAMA. 
On August 29, 2005, Khan sent his written GRAMA request to DPS, in which he 
specifically stated: "I am requesting records concerning my complaints to the Utah 
Department of Public Safety and to the Utah Homeland Security Department. Following is 
the information concerning which I am requesting the records." Then, he specifically 
mentioned the particulars of his complaints, i.e., the date (November 8, 2002) and the 
subject matters ("terrorism and crimes against me" and "the illegal actions of the Ogden City 
Police") of his complaints. He specifically mentioned that he had corresponded with the 
named DPS officers and agents "about my [November 8, 2002] complaints." Khan also 
specifically mentioned that he had informed DPS about the failure of the Ogden Police to 
investigate his complaint of the 'recent' crimes against him that he had filed on April 17, 
2003. Khan requested records pertaining to his November 8, 2002 complaints to DPS, and 
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also Mr. Keyser's records. (Addendum B, R. 299 & R. 373). In his affidavit (R. 414-415), 
he stated the facts about his GRAMA request and his November 8, 2002 complaints to DPS. 
At the time he sent his GRAMA request, he did not have DPSfs retention policies, and 
he did not know the descriptions of the internal paperwork, reports, information and 
records DPS had already generated pertaining to his November 8, 2002 complaints. It 
was reasonably impossible for him to describe all of those internal paperwork, reports, 
information and records that were already in DPS's possession with reasonable specificity 
in his GRAMA request. He described the requested records of correspondences between 
the named DPS officials and him, including the records of Mr. Keyser, that pertained to his 
November 8, 2002 complaints. In his GRAMA request, he requested records pertaining to 
his November 8, 2002 complaints to DPS. Those records would include the existing 
investigation reports of DPS pertaining to his November 8, 2002 complaints, the records 
and information pertaining to his complaints that DPS had already generated and retained 
pursuant to its retention policies, and the correspondences between the named DPS 
officials and him that had taken place pertaining to his complaints. Khan did not request 
Appellees to create records in response to his GRAMA request. Based on the 
circumstances, his GRAMA request provided all of the specific information with 
reasonable specificity. 
In his affidavit, Khan wrote: "[After I sent my GRAMA request,] [DPS] failed to 
provide me the requested records or to issue a denial" (R. 415, para. 24); Appellees1 
response states: "Defendants dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 24. [DPS] denied 
9 
Khan's request" (R. 428, para. 17). DPS violated Utah Code §63-2-204(3)(a) and §63-2-
205. Khan filed his GRAMA appeal to DPS's Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO"), 
stating "On August 29, 2005,1 had sent my [GRAMA] Request to [DPS], and had 
requested records concerning my complaints to [DPS] . . . (copy enclosed)." He enclosed 
a copy of his GRAMA request (his Brief, pgs. 5-6). That enclosed GRAMA request 
provided all of the specific information with reasonable specificity, as stated above. 
In his Brief (pgs. 30-31; also R. 16-17), Khan disputed the DPS CAO's response of 
October 3, 2005 to his GRAMA appeal; also, see above regarding his facts about 
Investigation Reports. DPS's "response that it had conducted no investigation and thus had 
no investigation records" is not accurate and not in compliance with GRAMA. In Khanfs 
discovery request, he had requested records "that are relevant to one or more of the subject 
matters involved in this action" (R. 169-172). DPS, then, produced Investigation Reports 
(R. 369-372; R. 373-374; Addendum B, R. 221 & 222) and also some records (R. 262, 376-
378, 387, 389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-212,214-226); all of 
these, produced by DPS during discovery, pertain to Khan's November 8,2002 complaints, 
and are responsive to his GRAMA request; DPS has had all of them in its possession. 
Pursuant to the identified DPS's retention policies, which it had produced to Khan (his Brief, 
pg. 7; Addendum C), it is required to retain the described records (R. 419, paras. 45,46, & 
48; R. 430, para. 32). Those responsive, retained records and information exist; DPS did not 
produce those records. DPS violated the GRAMA, the laws, and Khan's constitutional and 
legal rights. Its interpretation of Khan's GRAMA request is unfair and unreasonable. 
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Mr. Wyss produced copies of Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (R. 304, para. 6; R. 309, 
DPS/SRC 203; Addendum B, R. 221 & 222), see above; the copies of those Investigation 
Reports are incomplete and untrue. Khan stated that the affidavit of Mr. Wyss is 
misleading, inaccurate, and invalid (his Brief pgs. 16-18 and 39-41). 
In its Order, the district court did not mention the following material facts: (1) Mr. 
Miller's incomplete and untrue Investigation Reports; (2) the retention policies of DPS; and 
(3) the official correspondences between the named DPS officials and Khan. DPS did not 
comply with the GRAMA, with the applicable laws, and violated Khan's constitutional and 
legal rights. Khan's competent and undisputed evidence does not support the district court's 
conclusion; his affidavit and the affidavit of Mr. Wyss are directly opposed as to the material 
facts. 
Khan set forth specific, material facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. 
Therefore, this Court should not affirm the grant of summary judgment to the Department. 
B. The district court incorrectly determined the Records Committee 
complied with the GRAMA and the Administrative Rules. 
Khan disputes Appellees' statements in their Brief (pgs. 22-24). The CAO of DPS wrote: 
"You have the right to appeal this denial to the State Records Committee pursuant to Utah 
Code. Ann. §63-2-403, or to the district court pursuant to §63-2-404." (Addendum B, R. 11). 
On November 1, 2005, Khan filed a notice of appeal to the State Records Committee 
pursuant to §63-2-403, appealing the denial of his GRAMA appeal by the CAO. (R. 15-18). 
According to Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b), the chair of the Committee, and not the 
Executive Secretary, determines "that sufficient facts have or have not been alleged." 
11 
Appellees and their attorney have failed to cite the record where "Khan attempts to assail 
the Records Committee's determination and trial court's conclusion with bald assertions and 
conjectural statements" and "[Khan] opts instead to assert the Committee had no sound 
reason to deny him a hearing" (their Brief, pg. 23); they also failed to identify the alleged 
"bald assertions and conjectural statements." They have failed to comply with Utah R. App. 
P. 24(b) and 24(a)(9), and this Court should strike these statements or their Brief; he disputes 
their statements. Khan is unable to sufficiently respond to these statements of theirs. His 
facts are: (1) the Records Committee's order of November 7, 2005 stated: "Sufficient facts 
have not been alleged to determine that the records do exist" (R. 8); on that date, the 
Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) stated the petitioner should provide "sufficient evidence . . . 
that [the] record did exist at one time" (Addendum C, R. 9). Ms. Tuttle and the Committee 
deleted three words of that Rule, and changed the tense of one word. (2) In his affidavit, 
Khan wrote that, from Appellees, "I received a few relevant, public records after I had 
[served] the request for production of documents and [filed] the Rule 37 motion. Those 
relevant records are Investigation Reports of Mr. Keyser, Mr. McKee, and Mr. Miller, one 
correspondence of mine with Mr. Flowers, and other relevant records" (R. 419, para. 42). In 
Appellees' response, they "dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 42" (R. 430, para. 29). In 
her affidavit, Ms. Tuttle of the Records Committee produced DPS's Investigation Reports 
and some records "pertaining to Mr. Khan" after making a search of the records of "the State 
Records Committee" (see R. 313, paras. 5 & 6; R. 315-319; Khan's Brief, pgs. 30-31). (3) 
In Khan's Notice of Appeal to the Committee, he provided sufficient evidence in support of 
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his GRAMA appeal that the records did exist at one time (R. 15-17); this fact is supported 
by Ms. Turtle's affidavit (see the previous fact (2)), and by R. 304-310 and R. 313-319. He 
gave the Committee copies of his GRAMA request and the DPS CAO's determination. (4) 
Pursuant to the Committee's Administrative Rules and retention policies, which it had 
produced to Khan (his Brief, pg. 7; Addendum C), it is required to retain records (R. 419, 
paras. 45, 47, & 48; R. 430, para. 32). The identified Rules and retention policies describe 
the records to be retained; the Committee did not produce those records. 
As stated above for DPS, the Committee produced Investigation Reports and also the 
identified records; all of these, produced by the Committee during discovery, pertain to 
Khan's November 8, 2002 complaints, and are responsive to his GRAMA request; the 
Committee has had all of them in its possession. 
In its Order, the district court did not mention the following material facts: (1) Mr. 
Miller's incomplete and untrue Investigation Reports; (2) the Administrative Rules and 
retention policies of the Records Committee; and (3) the official correspondences between 
the named DPS officials and Khan. The Committee and Ms. Tuttle did not comply with the 
GRAMA, with the applicable laws and the Administrative Rules, and violated Khan's 
constitutional and legal rights. Khan's sound, competent and undisputed evidence does not 
support the district court's conclusion; his affidavit and the affidavit of Ms. Tuttle are 
directly opposed as to the material facts. 
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Khan set forth specific, material facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. 
Therefore, this Court should not affirm the grant of summary judgment to the Records 
Committee. 
The district court's findings misrepresented or misquoted the Committee's order and Rule 
R35-2-2(b); the court included those findings in its "Undisputed Material Facts," and Khan 
stated that those were clearly erroneous. (Addendum A, R. 442; Khan's Brief, pgs. 28-29). 
The court granted summary judgment to the Committee based on those findings, also. The 
errors are not harmless. 
Utah Code §63-2-204(7) states: "If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested 
records or issue a denial within the specified time period, that failure is considered the 
equivalent of a determination denying access to the record." §63-2-205(2)(c) and (d) state 
"that the requester has the right to appeal the denial" to the CAO of the governmental entity, 
and specifies the time limits for filing an appeal. Since §63-2-204(7) applied to this case, 
Khan filed an appeal to the CAO of DPS (R. 301). After the CAO denied his appeal, Khan 
filed a notice of appeal with the Executive Secretary of the Records Committee, pursuant to 
§63-2-403. After the Committee issued its order, he filed his petition for judicial review by 
the district court of the State Records Committee's order, pursuant to §63-2-404(1) and to 
the statement in that order. One of the court's "undisputed material facts" states that Khan 
"petitioned this Court for judicial review of the [DPS] Commissioner's response" 
(Addendum A, R. 442); Khan showed that this finding is clearly erroneous (his Brief, pgs. 
27-28). The court's findings and Order are not based on the judicial review of the Records 
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Committee's order; the court's grant of summary judgment and Order are based on "the 
department's [i.e., DPS's] response to [Khan's GRAMA] request" (Addendum A, R. 443). 
The district court's failure to perform judicial review of the Records Committee's order 
clearly violates §63-2-404 and the GRAMA. There is a doubt as to whether the court "made 
its decision de novo." (§63-2-404(7)(a)). All of these serious errors and violations are not 
harmless errors. If the court had not made these serious errors or legal mistakes, there is a 
sufficiently high likelihood that, based on the material facts Khan has set forth in his 
Briefs, Appellees' motion for summary judgment would have been denied. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
C. The district court's order did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Khan disputes Appellees' statements in their Brief (pgs. 25-26). Appellees wrote: "Khan 
also contends the trial court erred by failing to enter specific findings of fact on all material 
issues." (Their Brief, pg. 25). Appellees and their attorney have failed to cite the record 
where Khan contended this, and Khan is unable to sufficiently respond to this statement of 
theirs. They have failed to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(b) and 24(a)(9), and this Court 
should strike this statement or their Brief. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) states: "In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .. .." In this case, there was no jury and 
no advisory jury. "Regardless of what the rule in terms requires, whenever the decision of a 
matter requires the court to resolve conflicting versions of the facts, findings are desirable 
and ought to be made" (Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 3d §2575). 
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The court did not find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law on 
Khan's allegations of the violations of his constitutional "right of access to information 
concerning the conduct of the public's business" (Utah Code §63-2-102(l)(a)), and his legal 
rights of access to unrestricted public records (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-
201(1)). In enacting the GRAMA, the Utah Legislature recognized the constitutional right 
(§63-2-102(l)(a)); Utah's GRAMA is based on that constitutional right and the legal rights. 
Khan disputes Appellees' arguments about violations of his constitutional right (their 
Brief, pg. 26, note 5). The Utah constitutional right (§63-2-102(l)(a)), the legal rights, and 
Utah's GRAMA are the bases for Khan's GRAMA request; he did not cite any "federal 
constitutional right to access particular documents or information under governmental 
control;" he did not cite a general first amendment right. Khan did not request particular 
records (his Brief, pg. 46); his GRAMA request is for records and information pertaining to 
his November 8, 2002 complaints. He did not request "immediate access to everything 
government officials do or that records contain" if the records and/or information were not 
relevant to one or more of the subject matters involved in this action. 
Appellees cited Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 (their Brief, pg. 26, note 5) in which the 
constitutional issue was not an issue in that case itself; that issue arose in connection with 
the action of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the GRAMA is based on the Utah 
constitutional right (§63-2-102(l)(a)), too; that right is inherent to the GRAMA. Khan 
presented competent evidence which shows that, before he filed the Petition and in their 
responses to his GRAMA request and GRAMA appeals (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8), 
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Appellees did not provide him a single, existing and responsive record or a single, existing 
Investigation Report pertaining to his November 8, 2002 complaints. Appellees produced 
some existing and responsive records and Investigation Reports, pertaining to his November 
8, 2002 complaints, after he served the discovery request and filed the motion to compel. 
The court did not comply with Rule 52(a) by not finding the facts specially and stating 
separately its conclusions of law on Khan's valid claims of violations of his constitutional 
right and legal rights, and of Appellees' noncompliance with the GRAMA and the applicable 
laws in their responses to his GRAMA request and GRAMA appeals, i.e., before he filed the 
Petition. 
The court did not find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law on 
awarding Khan the full and reasonable costs incurred by him in effecting the formal service 
upon Appellees, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(f)(4) (R. 237-240), and on Khan's requests for 
relief (R. 42). 
Khan set forth specific, material facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. 
Therefore, this Court should not affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
III. KHAN DID NOT RECEIVE ALL OF THE RECORDS IN APPELLEES' 
POSSESSION THAT PERTAIN TO HIS NOVEMBER 8,2002 
COMPLAINTS, AND THAT ARE RESPONSIVE TO HIS 
GRAMA REQUEST; THUS, HIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT. 
Khan disputes Appellees1 statements in their Brief (pgs. 26-28). His GRAMA request is 
for records pertaining to his November 8, 2002 complaints of crimes and terrorism against 
him and the illegal actions of the Ogden Police. (Addendum B, R.299 & R. 373). 
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In Ms. Turtle's affidavit, she wrote: "5. . . . I made a reasonably diligent search of the 
records of the State Records Committee in an effort to determine the existence and 
whereabouts of records pertaining to Mr. Khan . . . 7. That the Records Committee, based 
upon its searches and belief, has no other records, nor am I aware of any other records in the 
Records Committee's possession pertaining to Khan." (R. 313 & 314). In Mr. Wyss's 
affidavit, he wrote: "7. I made a diligent search of the records of [DPS], and contacted 
various [DPS] employees in an effort to determine the existence and whereabouts of 
documents pertaining to Mr. Khan and I did not find any records beyond those listed on the 
attached index.... 10. So far as I am aware, those non-privileged records [DPS] could 
locate that did or may have pertained to Mr. Khan have been made available to Mr. Khan." 
(R. 304 & 305). Khan argues that their affidavits give "no detail as to the scope of the 
[search] and thus is insufficient as a matter of law to establish its completeness." Weisberg v. 
UX Dep't. of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 370 (C.A.D.C. 1980). He argues their affidavits "do not 
provide information specific enough to enable [Khan] to challenge the procedures utilized. 
Under these circumstances, issues genuinely existed as to the thoroughness of [their] search, 
and consequently summary judgment was improper." (Id. at 371). (Weisberg is analogous to 
this GRAMA case of Khan.) 
In his affidavit, Khan wrote: "[After I filed the motion for an order compelling 
discovery,] [Appellees] produced a few more public records that are relevant to [my] 
GRAMA request" (R. 418, para. 41). In Appellees' response, they "dispute the alleged facts 
of paragraph 41. [Appellees] provided Khan some additional documents they located after 
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responding to Khan's original request for production of documents and supplemented their 
response . . . these documents are not responsive to Khan's original GRAMA request." (R. 
429-30, para. 28). There is only one GRAMA request dated August 29, 2005, addressed to 
DPS (Addendum B, R. 299). Appellees also produced Investigation Reports (R. 369-372; 
R. 373-374; Addendum B, R. 221 & 222) and some of the records (R. 262, 376-378, 387, 
389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-212,214-226) in response to 
his request for production of documents and to his motion to compel. These produced, 
public records "are relevant to one or more of the subject matters involved in this action" (R. 
169-172); these records, produced by Appellees during discovery, pertain to Khan's 
November 8, 2002 complaints, and are responsive to his GRAMA request. In his affidavit, 
Khan wrote that, from Appellees, "I received a few relevant, public records after I had 
[served] the request for production of documents and [filed] the Rule 37 motion. Those 
relevant records are Investigation Reports of Mr. Keyser, Mr. McKee, and Mr. Miller, one 
correspondence of mine with Mr. Flowers, and other relevant records" (R. 419, para. 42). In 
Appellees' response, they "dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 42" (R. 430, para. 29). 
As Khan stated above, Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports are incomplete; Appellees did 
not produce the existing, true and complete copies of Mr. Miller's two official Investigation 
Reports, including the synopses, the letter, the information, and the cover sheet (Addendum 
B, R. 221 & 222) that pertain to Khan's November 8, 2002 complaints (see Khan's Brief, pg. 
14-15). (Appellees had written that they "did not provide [Khan] two privileged documents 
. . . of Agents Keyser and McKee" (R. 188); later, the court ordered them to give Khan the 
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redacted copies of those two privileged documents (Investigation Reports) of Agents Keyser 
and McKee (R. 369-372, & R. 373-374). (Khan's Brief, pg. 8)). In the district court, 
Appellees did not argue that Mr. Miller's Reports were privileged. Since Appellees 
themselves introduced Mr. Miller's two Investigation Reports into this case by producing 
parts of these Reports to Khan, Khan argues they are required to produce the true and 
complete copies of these two existing Reports, including the synopses, the letter, the 
information, and the cover sheet. They did not produce Mr. Keith's official communications 
(R. 380). They did not produce the privileged records (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 6). In 
its Order, the court did not dispute that Appellees failed to produce the complete and true 
copies of Mr. Miller's two, existing, official Investigation Reports, Mr. Keith's official 
communications, and the privileged records. These official records exist, and Appellees did 
not produce them. Based on Khan's undisputed evidence, his appeal is not moot. 
Pursuant to Appellees' retention policies and Administrative Rules, which they 
themselves had produced to Khan (his Brief, pg. 7; Addendum C), they are required to retain 
the described records. The identified, retention policies and Rules describe the records to be 
retained. In its Order, the court did not dispute that: (1) Appellees' retention policies and 
Administrative Rules exist; and (2) they failed to produce all of those identified, retained 
records. Hence, those identified, responsive, retained records and information exist; 
Appellees have failed to produce those, and they have violated the GRAMA, the applicable 
laws, Rules, and Khan's constitutional and legal rights. Therefore, based on Khan's 
competent evidence, his appeal is not moot. 
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Appellees produced copies of only five official correspondences between DPS officials 
and Khan (R. 376, 377 & 378; R. 148, DPS/SRC 1 & 2) pertaining to his November 8,2002 
complaints. They "do not dispute that Khan addressed letters and electronic mail to 
employees of [DPS] and the Utah Division of Homeland Security in 2002 and 2003" 
regarding his November 8, 2002, complaints (R. 414, para. 4; R. 426, para. 4; R. 409, paras. 
1 & 2; R. 422, paras. 1 & 2); they admit Mr. Keith of DPS "communicated with an Ogden 
Police official regarding [Khan's] complaint to DPS" (R. 41L para. 22; R. 380; R. 424, para. 
14). But they did not produce all of those official correspondences that pertain to his 
November 8, 2002 complaints, and that are responsive to his GRAMA request. They wrote: 
"Messrs. Miller and Keith no longer work for [DPS] and [DPS] no longer has copies of or 
cannot locate any correspondence between Khan and these individuals that may exist other 
than those produced in discovery" (R. 430, para. 30). Khan argues that he had corresponded 
with them and the other named DPS officials, while they had been working for DPS, about 
the terrorism, the crimes, and the illegal actions of Police (R. 414-415, paras. 4-8,10,11, 15, 
and 16; Addendum B, R. 299). It is not reasonable to believe that DPSfs official 
correspondences on such crimes are not in DPS or the Records Committee; a jury could 
reasonably infer the existence of these material, official correspondences. In its Order, the 
court did not mention, and did not dispute, the above-mentioned official correspondences 
between the named DPS officials and Khan; the court did not dispute that Appellees failed 
to produce all of those responsive, material and official correspondences. Hence, the 
responsive, material, official correspondences exist, and Appellees have failed to produce 
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them. Therefore, based on Khan's competent evidence, his appeal is not moot. 
Khan disputed some of the statements of Mr. Wyss and Ms. Turtle in their affidavits (see 
Khan's Brief, pgs. 16-18). He had corresponded with Governor Mike Leavitt, Mr. Miller, 
Mr. McKee and Mr. Keyser concerning his November 8, 2002 complaints {Id., pg. 4; his 
affidavit R. 414, paras. 4-8, 10-12; R. 419, para. 42). Mr. Miller's "Investigation Reports" 
are investigation reports of Khan's complaints of "Terroristic Threats" and crimes against 
him, and those Reports also state "Possible Criminal Actions." (Addendum B, R. 221 & 
222). The reports of Mr. Keyser and Mr. McKee pertain to Khan's November 8,2002 
complaints, and are titled "Investigation Reports" (R. 369-372 & 373-374); also see above in 
this Reply Brief. Hence, DPS conducted investigations of his complaints. 
In Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: "Allegations such as those 
asserted by [pro se] petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the 
opportunity to offer supporting evidence." That Court also stated: "we hold [a pro se 
complaint] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." (Id.). Pro 
se Appellant Khan has produced competent and reliable evidence, above, in his pleadings 
and in his Brief to support his claim Appellees did not produce to him all of the material 
records and information in their possession that pertain to his November 8, 2002 complaints, 
and that are responsive to his GRAMA request. He has clearly identified, above, some of 
the existing, responsive and official records and information they have not produced to him 
during discovery; he does not possess some of those records and information. Appellees 
have violated the GRAMA, the applicable laws, and Khan's constitutional and legal rights. 
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The district court did not mention or dispute some of Khan's material facts and evidence, as 
stated above. 
Appellees did not produce the affidavits of the named DPS officials, Messrs. Behunin, 
Groll, Flowers, White, Keith, Miller, Keyser and McKee (even if some of them no longer 
work for DPS) who had personal knowledge of Khan's November 8, 2002 complaints, of 
the correspondences, and of the responsive records DPS had created and retained; the 
existence or nonexistence of the material records should be determined from the testimonies 
under oath of these named DPS officials. Appellees produced the affidavits only of Mr. 
Wyss and Ms. Turtle who have no personal knowledge of the matters in issue pertaining to 
Khan's November 8, 2002 complaints, and who searched for the records. Hence, genuine 
issues of material facts exist as to whether all of the records sought by Khan's GRAMA 
request has been produced, precluding summary judgment (Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't. of 
Justice, 543 R2d 308 (C.A.D.C. 1976)). Therefore, there are justiciable issues before this 
Court, and Khan's appeal is not moot. 
Khan disputes Appellees' statements in their Brief (note 6, pgs. 27-28). 
(1) On January 9, 2007, Khan filed his objections to the proposed order (R. 255-262). The 
court failed to serve its order on him (Addendum A, R. 263-265). Khan did not know of the 
court's decision on his objections to the proposed order and of its signed order until after he 
received the court's certified index of records (after May 24, 2007), which he received after 
he filed the notice of appeal. Also, on September 1, 2006, Khan filed his motion for a stay 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f)) on Appellees' motion for partial summary judgment (R. 127-130); on 
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that date, discovery was ongoing. Since the court did not give its decision on his motion for 
a stay, discovery has not been closed and it is incomplete. Discovery was not closed and 
complete on September 18, 2006 (R. 74-75), because Appellees produced the Investigation 
Reports and some responsive records (R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-226) after that date and 
into January 2007. In his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment motion, he 
stated that during discovery, DPS and the Records Committee had not produced all of the 
records that pertained to his November 8, 2002 complaints (R. 326 & R. 333); he has 
identified, above, some of the records they have not produced. Hence, discovery is 
incomplete (his Brief, pgs. 23-24). Therefore, the court's consideration of the second 
summary judgment motion was untimely and unsound. Appellees' statement that the court's 
Order was "a final judgment of dismissal" (their Brief, pg. 1) is incorrect. 
(2) Khan filed his motion for imposition of costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(f)(4). (R. 237-
240, 247-249). That Rule requires the court to "impose upon [Appellees] the costs 
subsequently incurred in effecting service." Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4)(A), the court should 
order Appellees to pay Khan the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order (R. 
257). The court should also award Khan "litigation costs reasonably incurred in 
connection with a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request if the requester 
substantially prevails." §63-2-802(2)(a). 
(3) Khan has presented his arguments in his Brief (pgs. 11-12) about the court's statements. 
He argues that Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and 7 allow him to file his memorandum in opposition to 
the summary judgment motion, and the court is required to base its decision on his 
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memorandum, too, and not just on Appellees' motion. The court used Appellees' wordings 
from their pleadings for its findings. In his Brief, he stated that the court's findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous, that the court abused its discretion, and that it erred by granting 
summary judgment motion. Hence, based on Khan's arguments, the court's statements in the 
court about his case are prejudicial or biased. 
Khan set forth specific, material facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. 
Therefore, this Court should not affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments presented in his Opening Brief, Khan has 
presented competent evidence, which shows Appellees have not produced the identified 
records and information that pertain to his November 8, 2002 complaints, and that are 
responsive to his GRAMA request. Appellees did not comply with the GRAMA and the 
applicable laws and Administrative Rules before Khan filed the Petition, and then, later, 
during valid discovery; they violated his constitutional right. Thus, they are not entitled to 
summary judgment. The court's Order clearly violates Utah Code §63-2-404 and the 
GRAMA. Khan requests this Court to not affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted on February 12,2008 
Nasrulla Khan 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
STATUTE & RULES 
U I O l & \)J-^-U\J^ 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-2-802 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 63. State Affairs in General 
* i Chapter 2. Government Records Access and Management Act (Refs & Annos) 
* • Part 8. Remedies 
••§ 63-2-802. Injunction—Attorneys' fees 
(1) A district court in this state may enjoin any governmental entity or political subdivision that 
violates or proposes to violate the provisions of this chapter. 
(2)(a) A district court may assess against any governmental entity or political subdivision reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in connection with a judicial appeal of a 
denial of a records request if the requester substantially prevails. 
(b) In determining whether to award attorneys' fees under this section, the court shall consider: 
(i) the public benefit derived from the case; 
(ii) the nature of the requester's interest in the records; and 
(iii) whether the governmental entity's or political subdivision's actions had a reasonable basis. 
(c) Attorneys' fees shall not ordinarily be awarded if the purpose of the litigation is primarily to 
benefit the requester's financial or commercial interest. 
(3) Neither attorneys' fees nor costs shall be awarded for fees or costs incurred during administrative 
proceedings. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a court may only award fees and costs incurred in connection 
with appeals to district courts under Subsection 63-2- 404(2) if the fees and costs were incurred 20 
or more days after the requester provided to the governmental entity or political subdivision a 
statement of position that adequately explains the basis for the requester's position. 
(5) Claims for attorneys' fees as provided in this section or for damages are subject to Title 63, 
Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out 
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references, (a)(3) A table of authorities with 
cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the 
pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of 
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
( a ) ( l l ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall 
be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the 
addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a) ( l l ) (A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a) ( l l ) (B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of 
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a) ( l l ) (C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except 
that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to 
the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the 
appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to 
the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to 
Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 
(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover 
page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to 
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not 
exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-
appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed 
the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. 
No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues 
raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply 
to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon motion 
permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be 
briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven 
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the 
brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitlea 
to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the 
draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, 
including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or 
appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that 
party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An 
original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the 
brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with 
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance 
may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in origmal)(quotmg West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 
545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of 
supporting authority. 
Rule 27. Form of briefs. 
(a) Paper size; printing margins. Briefs shall be typewritten, printed or prepared by photocopying or other duplicating or 
copying process that will produce clear, black and permanent copies equally legible to printing, on opaque, unglazed paper 8 
1/2 inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be securely bound along the left margin. Paper may be recycled paper, with or 
without deinking. The printing must be double spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced and indented. Margins 
shall be at least one inch on the top, bottom and sides of each page. Page numbers may appear in the margins. 
(b) Typeface. Either a proportionally spaced or monospaced typeface in a plain, roman style may be used. A proportionally 
spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text and footnotes. Examples are CG Times, Times New Roman, New 
Century, Bookman and Garamond. A monospaced typeface may not contain more than ten characters per inch for both text 
and footnotes. Examples are Pica and Courier. 
(c) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page, and bound with a compact-type binding so as not unduly to 
increase the thickness of the brief along the bound side. Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not acceptable. 
(d) Color of cover; contents of cover. The cover of the opening brief of appellant shall be blue; that of appellee, red; that of 
intervenor, guardian ad litem, or amicus curiae, green; that of any reply brief, or in cases involving a cross-appeal, the 
appellant's second brief, gray; that of any petition for rehearing, tan; that of any response to a petition for rehearing, white; 
that of a petition for certiorari, white; that of a response to a petition for certiorari, orange; and that of a reply to the 
response to a petition for certiorari, yellow. All brief covers shall be of heavy cover stock. There shall be adequate contrast 
between the printing and the color of the cover. The cover of all briefs shall set forth in the caption the full title given to the 
case in the court or agency from which the appeal was taken, as modified pursuant to Rule 3(g), as well as the designation 
of the parties both as they appeared in the lower court or agency and as they appear in the appeal. In addition, the covers 
shall contain: the name of the appellate court; the number of the case in the appellate court opposite the case title; the title 
of the document (e.g., Brief of Appellant); the nature of the proceeding in the appellate court (e.g., Appeal, Petition for 
Review); the name of the court and judge, agency or board below; and the names and addresses of counsel for the 
respective parties designated as attorney for appellant, petitioner, appellee, or respondent, as the case may be. The names 
of counsel for the party filing the document shall appear in the lower right and opposing counsel in the lower left of the 
cover. In criminal cases, the cover of the defendant's brief shall also indicate whether the defendant is presently 
incarcerated in connection with the case on appeal and if the brief is an Anders brief. 
(e) Effect of non-compliance with rules. The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing. If they are not prepared in 
accordance with these rules, they will not be filed but shall be returned to be properly prepared. The clerk shall retain one 
copy of the non-complying brief and the party shall file a brief prepared in compliance with these rules within 5 days. The 
party whose brief has been rejected under this provision shall immediately notify the opposing party in writing of the 
lodging. The clerk may grant additional time for bringing a brief into compliance only under extraordinary circumstances. 
This rule is not intended to permit significant substantive changes in briefs. 
Advisory Committee Note - The change from the term "pica size" to "ten characters per inch" is intended to accommodate 
the widespread use of word processors. The definition of pica is print of approximately ten characters per inch. The 
amendment is not intended to prohibit proportionally spaced printing. 
An Anders brief is a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 793, 97 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), in cases where counsel 
believes no nonfrivolous appellate issues exist. In order for an Anders-type brief to be accepted by either the Utah Court of 
Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, counsel must comply with specific requirements that are more rigorous than those set 
forth in Anders. See, e.g. State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 304, 13 P.3d 1056 (per curiam); In re D.C., 963 P.2d 761 (Utah App. 
1998); State v. Flores, 855 P.2d 258 (Utah App. 1993) (per curiam); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990); and State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a cross claim, if the 
answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the 
provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, 
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in 
proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state 
succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be 
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a 
party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in 
opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the 
memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed 
order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall 
not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an over-length 
memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which 
the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the 
moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the 
opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of authorities 
with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the memorandum, such 
as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The 
request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if 
any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no 
party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum 
or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the document 
containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would 
dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion 
is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. 
An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise 
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who 
made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's 
initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by 
the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed 
order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. 
The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the 
time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not incorporate 
any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court 
until modified by the court. A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a 
motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter 
under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may respond to the objection 
in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motioi i for order compelling discovery, A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, 
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in wlrich tlle action is pending, or, 
on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an 
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the coiirt in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party i t lay n love to compel disclosure and 
for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted 
to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other 
entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under 
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will 
be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order 
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must 
include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to 
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral 
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or inconiplete 
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions, 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party 
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good 
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, 
or objection was substantially justified, oi that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, aftei 
opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who 
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the cout t may enter atry protective order authorized under Rule 
26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among 
the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order, 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken, If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after 
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,, the failure may be considered a 
contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in wl lich actioi i is pendii ig. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf 
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 35, , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take 
such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance witn 
the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party fi on i suppoiiimiq n|ipoMmi il i^niii. i i i ' i l i I, r«. in defenses or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or th«- <i'fn':- v ^ pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failui e; 
(b)(2)(E) treat thp Milure * - *• •• <>• 'der to submit to a physical or i nental examination, as contempt 
of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding air t adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or 
the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to 
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the 
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of 
no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the 
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a 
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, 
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, 
the court . on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the grout id tt lat the discovery sought is objectionable 
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is reqin'red by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may take any action authorized 
by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other materia! as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26 
(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieii of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, 
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system. 
